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Monday, January 20, 2020

Final Report on the UK Blackout of August 9, 2019 -- LESSONS LEARNED ARE NOT OBVIOUS

LESSONS  LEARNED ?
We already knew 
adding low inertia 
electricity generators, 
such as wind and solar, 
will make 
any electric grid 
less stable,

The costs of a 
largely decentralized 
generation "portfolio", 
much of it wind and solar,
include more frequent 
brownouts and blackouts.

A former 
National Grid 
director has said
that UK ministers 
should impose limits 
on new wind and solar 
farms, to help avoid 
power cuts. 









E3C is the Energy 
Emergencies 
Executive 
Committee (E3C) 
of the Department 
for Business, Energy 
and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS). 

The E3C report 
is encouraging 
consumers 
of all kinds 
to develop 
“strong business 
continuity plans” 
   covering 
“a range of 
credible power 
disruption 
scenarios”. 

Blame the 
electricity 
customers ?

The E3C is 
indirectly saying:  
'Forget about 
past decades 
of a robust UK 
electricity supply. 

In the 
new world, 
with growing 
reliance on
solar and 
wind power, 
this is likely to 
happen again'.

So I guess everyone 
in the UK should buy 
a natural gas, gasoline 
or diesel fuel 
powered generator 
( and don't you dare blame 
the solar and wind farms ) !


Here's my summary:
The extreme grid 
management 
measures 
required by 
the increasing 
use of “clean” 
wind and solar
electricity systems, 
are moving beyond 
the abilities of the 
system operators
to precisely match 
electricity demand with 
electricity production.



BLACKOUT  SUMMARY:
The blackout disconnected 
over 1 million consumers 
for nearly an hour.

Impacts 
persisted 
for days, 
in some cases, 
and several weeks, 
for an oil refinery.

All caused by just 
one lightening strike, 
which suggests 
a not very robust 
electricity system.

Overall weaknesses 
in the UK electricity 
system emerges from 
these two new reports.

Electricity systems 
shift from stability 
to chaos in fractions 
of a second, while the 
causes of a blackout 
take weeks, or months,
to understand.



DETAILS:
A lightning strike 
triggered the 
disconnection 
of 150 MW of 
Distributed 
Generation.

Distributed generation refers to a variety of technologies that generate electricity at or near where it will be used, such as solar panels and combined heat and power. ... 
In the residential sector, common distributed generation systems include: Solar photovoltaic panels and small wind turbines.

That was 
losely followed 
by the loss 
of 737 MW 
of the 
Hornsea 1 
offshore 
wind farm. 

Then the 
steam unit 
at Little Barford 
Combined Cycle 
Gas Turbine 
tripped off. 

All of this happened 
within one second 
of one lightning strike.

The two main 
Transmission System 
connected generators, 
Hornsea 1 and 
the Little Barford, 
have both been fined 
£4.5 million each, 
for failing to ride 
through the fault.

The consequent drop 
in frequency triggered 
further disconnections 
of Distributed Generators. 

Then the first 
of the two 
gas turbines 
at Little Barford 
had to disconnect, 
closely followed by 
the second  
gas turbine, 
and yet more 
Distributed 
Generation.

Distributed Generation 
means generators 
that are connected to, 
and sometimes said 
to be “embedded within”, 
the Distribution Network. 

These generators 
are usually invisible 
to the system operator, 
and can range from 
very small domestic 
systems, right up to
large onshore wind 
and solar installations.

Distributed Generation 
was a leading cause 
of the severity of 
the August 9 blackout.

It's also increasing 
the future risks 
to the security of 
the electricity supply.



FINAL  REPORTS:
Both the UK electricity 
market regulator, 
Ofgem, and the 
Energy Emergencies 
Executive Committee 
          ( E3C ) 
of the Department 
for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy 
         ( BEIS ) 
have now (early January) 
released their final reports 
on the August 9, 2019 
blackout.

Ofgem’s work 
is almost complete 
( there is one more 
yet to be published 
technical paper ), 
and concentrates on 
regulatory compliance.

E3C examines 
measures 
that should be, 
or are being taken 
to:

a) 
Reduce the likelihood 
of a recurrence 
of a similar blackout, 
and  

b)
Improve the way 
such a blackout 
is handled if it 
can't be prevented



There were some 
new facts about
the blackout:

- Four hospitals, 
not just the 
Ipswich Hospital, 
were disconnected 
by the blackout 

- National Grid
over-zealously 
reconnected 
the Hornsea 1 
wind farm, before 
it was confident 
that the wind farm’s 
“technical issues” 
had been understood. 

- 371 rail services 
were cancelled, 
and 220 were 
part cancelled



The E3C report says 
“There is a significant possibility 
that the total volume of loss 
of embedded generation 
on 9 August is in excess 
of the transmission connected 
generation lost during the event.” 

Since the transmission-
connected generation 
lost was Hornsea 
and Little Barford, 
and they total 1,384 MW, 
we can assume 
about 1.5 GW of 
Distributed Generation 
disconnected over
the entire event. 

That suggests the 
total generation loss 
during the blackout 
was a huge 3 GW. 

Distribution Network 
Operators (DNOs), 
disconnected 
about 5% of load, 
totaling 892 MW 
of net demand. 

Although the DNOs 
disconnected 892 MW 
of demand, the observed 
benefit to the system, 
at this time of extreme 
stress, was only 350 MW.

In total, 550 MW of 
embedded generation 
was disconnected by 
measures taken 
to address the blackout. 

Because of 
the presence of 
embedded 
generators, 
remedial actions 
to address 
a system 
disturbance 
actually made 
the problem worse !


Both Hornsea 
and Little Barford 
have been penalized. 

But neither of them are 
embedded generators, 
and they have no role 
in the management 
of such generation. 

National Grid 
was not fined.

Ofgem said:   
 […] the ESO 
could have been 
more proactive 
in understanding 
and addressing 
issues with 
distributed 
generation 
and its impact 
on system 
security. 
( page 22 )